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Civil Code and Related Subjects
PERSONS
Robert A. Pascal*
The decisions by the Supreme Court on marriage, separation,
and divorce, other than two cases dealing with the recognition
of sister-state divorces and the domicile of a married woman,
which are treated in this Symposium under the section on the
Conflict of Laws,' either involved only questions of fact or applied well-recognized rules of law. These cases do not require
discussion.2 There were, however, several decisions relating to
alimony, support of descendants through civil and criminal processes, adoption, and custody which are noteworthy.
Alimony after Separation or Divorce
In Moody v. Moody' the court held, as it had been decided
once before 4 that a post-separation agreement regarding alimony necessarily falls with the separation itself on the reconciliation of the parties, so that if the parties subsequently are divorced or separated the agreement does not prevent the wife
from claiming alimony. The reason given was sufficient to dispose of the issue in this suit, but it may very well be asked
whether any agreement limiting a future right or obligation as
to alimony should be regarded as binding. For one thing, alimony laws would seem to exist in the public or social interest as
well as in that of the individual dependent. For another, the relieving of one alimentary obligor for the future, regardless of
the need in which the dependent may then be, can only shift the
obligation to other obligors who thereby will be prejudiced at
least to the extent of having to contribute more than otherwise
would have been required of them. For both reasons it would
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. See page 255 infra.
2. Succession of Gaines, 227 La. 318, 79 So.2d 322 (1955) (proof of marriage) ; Pecot v. Hill, 227 La. 131, 78 So.2d 535 (1955) and Steere v. Marston,
228 La. 94, 81 So.2d 822 (1955) (whether spouses had been separated in fact for
two-year period required for divorce under LA. R.S. 9:301 [1950]); Harris v.
Harris, 228 La. 19, 81 So.2d 705 (1955) (proof of adultery) ; Dejean v. DeBose,
226 La. 600, 76 So.2d 900 (1955) (the presence vel non of cruel treatment sufficient to warrant separation from bed and board).
3. 227 La. 134, 78 So.2d 536 (1955).
4. Reichert v. Lloveras, 1.88 La. 447, 177 So. 569 (1937).
[218]
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seem that agreements limiting future alimentary obligations or
5
rights violate article 11 of the Louisiana Civil Code.
Olivier v. Abunza 6 presented a novel question. A husband
sought a divorce, on the ground of two years separation in fact,
from a wife separated in bed and board from him by a judgment awarded to her some time before. The wife claimed alimony, but the husband sought to prove "fault" on her part in
order to deprive her of it. Justice McCaleb, in a concurring opinion, thought that inasmuch as the wife had obtained a judgment
of separation for cause the fault issue could not be raised in the
divorce proceedings. The majority opinion, however, seems to
have assumed that the issue of the wife's fault could be raised,
for it did consider the matter. But the court found the wife had
not been at fault in the divorce and therefore the legal question
may be considered undecided. It is true that once a wife has
obtained a separation, her rights to alimony after divorce are not
affected if the husband obtains the divorce on the ground of the
previous judicial separation and failure of reconciliation for one
year and sixty days thereafter.7 On the other hand, it would
seem that the wife should be denied alimony after divorce, in
spite of the judgment of separation in her favor, if the husband
thereafter obtains a divorce on the ground of adultery rather
than on the ground of non-reconciliation after the separation.
Separation may absolve the spouses of the obligation of common
life, but it does not put an end to the other obligations of matrimony. Indeed, it could very well be the offense of the separated
wife that prevents reconciliation. Should the answer be, different because the husband chooses to file suit on the ground of two
years separation in fact rather than on that of adultery? The
writer thinks not.
The decision in Stabler v. Stablers followed Smith v. Smith9
5. LA. CIVIL CODE art.- 11 (1870) : "Individuals can not by their conventions,
derogate from the force of laws made for the preservation of public order or good
morals.
"But in all cases in which it is not expressly or impliedly prohibited, they can
renounce what the law has established in their favor, when the renunciation does
not affect the rights of others, and is not contrary to the public good."
6. 226 La. 456, 76 So.2d 528 (1954).
7. LA. R.S. 9:302 (1950).
8. 226 La. 70, 75 So.2d 12 (1954).
9. 217 La. 646, 47 So.2d 32 (1950). On this case and the general problem
of computing alimony after divorce, see Lazarus, What Price Alimony, 11 LouISIANA LAW REVIEW 401, 418 et seq. (1951) ; The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 191,9-1950 Term - Persons, 11 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 168,
172 (1951).
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in holding that in considering a divorced wife's "means for her
maintenance" to determine her right to alimony after divorce 10
it is necessary to consider her capital assets as well as her income.
In this case the wife owned four rental houses valued at more
than $20,000 and producing revenue of about $120 monthly. She
was denied alimony even though her husband owned property
valued at $50,000 and had an income of about $1,000 monthly,
the court quoting with approval from the Smith case that "maintenance may be said to include primarily food, shelter, and clothing, and certainly property or means amounting to $20,000 ought
to provide those necessities very readily."
The only other decision on alimony after separation involved
a simple question of fact, the propriety of the amount of the
award."
The Alimentary Obligation Toward Descendants
In Fazzio v. Krieger12 the defendant parent admitted his legally imposed obligation to pay for the support of his children,
who were in the custody of his divorced wife, but asked whether
it was proper to order him to pay any alimony to them inasmuch
as his only income was his community share of his second wife's
earnings. His specific contention was that the obligation to support the children of his first marriage was a "debt contracted"
before his second marriage, and therefore a debt for which the
community of the second marriage was not liable. 13 The majority
opinion dismissed the contention reasoning that the defendant's
obligation to support children of a previous marriage is not a
debt contracted before the second marriage, "but an obligation
or duty imposed by law for which his undivided interest in the
second community is responsible.' 4 (Emphasis added.)
The court could not have meant what this language literally
signifies, for there is no way to enforce a right against one
spouse's share in the community before the community is dissolved. What the court must have meant to say is that only onehalf of the community income should be considered in computing
10. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 160 (1870).
11. DeLoach v. DeLoach, 227 La. 930, 80 So.2d 868 (1955). The same ques-

tion was also an issue in Moody v. Moody, 227 La. 134, 78 So.2d 536 (1955), discussed above in another connection.
12. 226 La. 511, 76 So.2d 713 (1954).
13. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2403 (1870).

14. 226 La. 511, 524, 76 So.2d 713, 717 (1954).
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the alimentary obligation of one of the spouses toward a descendant, but that the obligation so computed is enforceable out of the
community as a whole. Understood in this way the decision offers a solution, to a problem not specifically covered by legislation, which is in splendid harmony with the general legislation
on alimony and on the community. In considering only the
spouse's one-half interest in the community for computing his
alimentary obligation it respects both the notion that the obligation is his alone and not that of him and his spouse and honors
the doctrine that each spouse has a present one-half undivided
interest in the assets of the community, regardless of their
source. At the same time, in concluding that the obligation thus
determined is payable out of the community as a whole, it conforms to the principle evidenced by the rule in article 2403 that
during marriage the obligations of each spouse are liabilities of
the community.
If the writer's appreciation of Fazzio v. Krieger is correct,
then certain implications of this decision should be noted. First,
because the community itself is liable for alimony payable by
either spouse, the wife's dependent should be allowed to sue the
husband, as administrator of the community, to enforce his or
her right. Second, because in computing the liability of any married man for alimony only one-half of the community income may
be considered as his, the amounts awardable to divorced wives
under article 160 of the Civil Code must now be limited to onethird of his one-half of the community income.
The other decisions involving alimony for descendants were
of lesser importance. In Roy v. Berard15 the court refused to find
contempt of court in a father's failure to make two monthly alimony payments for a child when he had expended almost that
amount during that period for clothing for the child. All other
decisions dealt simply with the sufficiency or insufficiency of
6
the awards made in the lower courts?1
Compelling Support Through the Criminal Process
Three decisions of 1954-55 evidence a fine appreciation for
the nature of the proceedings under articles 74 and 7517 of the
15. 227 La. 86, 78 So.2d 519 (1955).
16. Moody v. Moody, 227 La. 134, 78 So.2d 536 (1955) ; DeLoach v. DeLoach,
227 La. 930, 80 So.2d 868 (1955) ; Williams v. Barnette, 226 La. 635, 76 So.2d
912 (1954).
17. 1A. R.S. 14:74-75 (1950).
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Louisiana Criminal Code and of the proper limits of the use of
the criminal process for the enforcement of alimentary obligations.
The decision in State v. Robbins 8 declared there is no incompatibility in the simultaneous existence of both a civil suit for
alimony and a prosecution for the crime of criminal neglect of
family under article 74 of the Louisiana Criminal Code. This is
certainly correct. The civil proceedings are for the determination of the extent of one's civil alimentary obligation for the future or the enforcement of one already fixed by a civil judgment
rendered in the past, whereas the object of proceedings under
article 74 is punishment for crime already committed, that is to
say, the past intentional failure to support one's wife or child
who was then in "destitute or necessitous circumstances."
This proposition is too elementary, however, not to have been
understood by the accused's attorney, who objected to the proceedings under article 74, and to the judge who upheld his objection. The explanation of their actions must be that both treated
the charge under article 74 simply as a precondition to the application of article 75 of the Criminal Code, under which the judge
before whom the charge is brought may order future alimony
payments either before trial, with the consent of the accused, or
after conviction, and either in lieu of or in addition to the sentence of fine and imprisonment imposable under article 74. Thus
both attorney and judge must have regarded the proceedings
more in the nature of a civil suit for alimony than a prosecution
for crime. No doubt this is a popular view of such proceedings,
but it is an incorrect one, for there can be no question as to the
criminal nature of a prosecution under article 74.
The case would have been more interesting had it been presented specifically as an attack on the right of the judge to proceed under article 75 once a suit for alimony had been filed in
civil court, for certainly an order under article 75 to pay future
alimony resembles a civil judgment for alimony. The writer does
not regard these different orders to pay alimony as incompatible,
however, but for reasons of convenience the discussion of this
question is postponed until another decision raising essentially
the same issue is considered. 19
18. 227 La. 454, 79 So.2d 737 (1955).
19. See note 22 infra.
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The second decision involving the application of article 74
of the Louisiana Criminal Code, State v. Breaux,20 goes far toward defining the proper scope of the crime of criminal neglect
of family. The essence of the crime is a husband's or parent's
intentional failure to support his wife or child "who is in destitute or necessitous circumstances." All depends, then, on the
proper interpretation of the words "destitute or necessitous circumstances." In State v. Breaux a husband and father had been
convicted of the criminal neglect of his wife and child, even
though the latter lived in a house which formed part of the community property and the wife earned an average of fifty dollars
weekly. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction and remanded the case to the trial court to determine whether the wife
and child were in "destitute or necessitous circumstances" in
spite of their free home and the earnings of the wife. This action
must be considered eminently proper, for it is at least very doubtful that article 74 was meant to declare criminal the mere failure to fulfill a civil alimentary obligation. The criterion by which
a legislature should define a crime is conduct which is so serious
in its effect on an individual as a human being or on the public
in general as to justify the imposition of criminal type sanctions.
Husbands and parents are obliged to support their wives and
children under the civil law, but hardly would it be justifiable to
treat their failure so to do as warranting criminal sanction so
long as the dependents do not lack the basic needs of human
beings according to the standards prevailing in the society, whatever be the honest source of their means. Thus the Legislature
must have intended the necessary pre-condition to conviction
under article 74 to be such destitution or necessity on the part of
the defendants as to make the intentional failure to support them
the equivalent of a willful denial to them of the basic needs of
human beings.
Probably it is not erroneous to assume that the dependent,
Mrs. Breaux, was not in destitute or necessitous circumstances,
and that she simply resorted to the criminal process to enforce
her civil substantive right to support from her husband, her
procedural right to do this in a civil suit being denied her under
20. 227 La. 417, 79 So.2d 502 (1955).
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a decision of the Supreme Court of another day. 21 She was, in
other words, probably seeking an order for future alimony under
article 75 because none was available to her through the civil
process. She must, therefore, have assumed that the amount of
alimony awardable under article 75 may exceed that necessary
to afford the dependent the basic needs of a human being and be
computed instead on the basis of the civil obligation of support,
that is, the relative need and means of the dependent and obligor.
But is this so? The writer believes it is not and that any order
under article 75 must be restricted to such amount as will remove the dependent from "destitute or necessitous circumstances" as above defined. This would seem to follow from the
very fact that article 75 cannot be invoked unless there is at least
a charge of criminal neglect under article 74. It would be incongruous indeed if an alimentary obligor could not be ordered
to fulfill his civil obligation if he had not been guilty of criminal
neglect, but, once guilty of criminal neglect, could be so ordered.
It seems much more likely that the purpose of article 75 was to
permit an order for future alimony which, if complied with,
would free the obligor of future liability for criminal neglect of
the dependent. The very fact that article 75 is found in a crim22
inal rather than in a civil statute adds support to this view.
The most important of the decisions dealing with article 74
is State v. Hubbard,28 for it is difficult to interpret it otherwise
than as a refusal to give effect to legislation which transgresses
the limits of the proper use of the criminal process. In this sense
the decision is jurisprudential rather than legal in character. The
case involved a prosecution for criminal neglect of an illegitimate
child whose filiation to the accused had not been established at
the time of the neglect. Such established filiation is a pre-condition to a civil suit for alimony, but by three different acts, in
21. Carroll v. Carroll, 42 La. Ann. 1069, 8 So. 400 (1890) interpreted LA.
CODE OF PRACTICE art. 105 (1870) to prohibit suits for support between husband
and wife, though LA. CIVIL CODE art. 119 (1870) establishes the substantive
alimentary rights and obligations between them.
22. If it is correct to conclude that an order under article 75 must be restricted to an amount sufficient for essential needs, then it would seem that the
question raised in the discussion of State v. Robbins, 227 La. 454, 79 So.2d 737
(1955) (see page 222 supra), whether a civil suit for alimony and the application of article 75 of the Criminal Code are compatible, may be answered in
the affirmative. The civil suit fixes the amount of the civil alimentary obligation, whereas the latter merely indicates the amounts which will be sufficient to
safeguard the obligor from prosecution for criminal neglect.
23. 228 La. 155, 81 So.2d 844 (1955).
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and 1954,26 the Legislature amended article 74

with the object of making it a crime for the actual parent of an
illegitimate to neglect him even though his filiation had not been
established. The 1950 and 1952 amendments were declared ineffective for this purpose by earlier decisions 27 and now the 1954
amendment is likewise made ineffective.
The principle point in the majority's reasoning seems to be
that the establishment of paternity or maternity is fundamentally a civil process over which the juvenile courts have not been
given jurisdiction and, therefore, that there can be no prosecution for criminal neglect of an illegitimate child unless his filiation already has been established. Certainly the majority opinion must have been written with tongue in cheek. It is not denied that the juvenile courts have jurisdiction over prosecutions
for criminal neglect of illegitimate children, and there can be no
doubt that article 74 as amended makes it a crime to neglect such
children even though their filiation has not been established. To
say, then, that the crime cannot be proved because the proof of
filiation is fundamentally a civil process over which the juvenile
court has not been given jurisdiction is simply an excuse for not
giving effect to the legislative intent. The true reason for the
court's action would seem to be expressed in the remarks made
after the decision had been reached on the grounds above given.
"It would be illogical," said the court, "and unsound to hold
otherwise and, we think, might well lead to injustice, oppression,
and absurd consequences. We think it would be most illogical to
convict the defendant of neglect of family, which of necessity required him to be decreed to be the father of such illegitimate
child who, under our substantive law, belongs to no family, and
simultaneously hold that the defendant deserted a child who had
never been under his custody, and intentionally failed to support
a child when theretofore there had been no such liability estab28
lished.1
Thus the court's action must be explained in terms of its conviction that the legislation amounted to a misuse of the criminal
process. With this view the writer is in complete accord. It is
24. La. Acts 1950, No. 164, p. 330.
25. La. Acts 1952, No. 368, p. 920.
26. La. Acts 1954, No. 298, p. 299.
27. State v. Mack, 224 La. 886, 71 So.2d 315 (1954) ; State v. Jones, 220
La. 381, 56 So.2d 724 (1951).
28. 81 So.2d 844, 848 (La. 1955).
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common knowledge that this amendatory legislation of 1950,
1952, and 1954 was sponsored by the State Department of Public
Welfare principally for the purpose of obtaining orders for future alimony under article 75 of the Criminal Code and thereby
reducing the number of illegitimate children on the child welfare
rolls. It is difficult to justify the use of the criminal process for
this purpose when the civil process could be used. If the real difficulty lies in the financial inability of the mothers of illegitimates to qualify as tutrixes and to establish the paternity of their
children and claim alimony for them, then it would seem that
the simple expedient would be legislation authorizing the state,
through the district attorneys or attorneys of the State Department of Public Welfare, to file such suits on behalf of illegitimate children and without cost to the state or the dependents.
Adoption and Custody
In the case of In re Byrd2 9 the petitioners argued that under
the current legislation 30 the consent of the actual parents is not
required if the adoption is in the best interest of the child. The
court was able to demonstrate very easily that under the legislation the norm of the child's best interest can be brought into play
only after the child has been made available for adoption, a fact
which depends on the consent of the parents at the time of the
adoption proceeding if the child has not been surrendered3 1 to an
agency for placement in adoption or declared abandoned.
The question of the custody of children, however, as distinguished from their availability for adoption, continues to be
dealt with in terms of the court's appreciation of the best interest of the child rather than in the context of the legislation. Thus
nothing in our legislation warrants the denial of custody to parents unless it can be shown that the child has been surrendered
29. 226 La. 194, 75 So.2d 331 (1954).
30. LA. R.S. 9:421 et seq. (1950), originally La. Acts 1948, No. 228, p. 564.
31. The famous issue of Green v. Paul, 212 La. 337, 31 So.2d 819 (1947),
whether the parental consent once given might be withdrawn at any time before
final decree of adoption, was not involved in this case for the parents had never
consented to those particular proceedings. The same petitioners, however, had
dismissed a previous proceeding to adopt the same child, filed under the former
legislation on adoption, La. Acts 1942, No. 154, p. 523, when the mother withdrew her once given consent just before final judgment, and the majority availed
themselves of the opportunity to affirm Green v. Paul. Justices Hamiter and
Hawthorne dissented, Justice Hawthorne stating that he had ceased to agree
with the decision in Green v. Paul and wished to say that in his opinion parental
consent once given should not be revocable once adoption proceedings had been
initiated.
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formally for adoption, declared abandoned, criminally neglected,
or its physical or moral welfare seriously endangered by its parents' vicious or immoral habits or associations,3 2 yet in State ex
rel. Deason v. McWilliams,33 though none of these causes seem
to have been made out under the facts, the court affirmed a
judgment denying the parents the right to recover the custody of
their child from persons to whom they had once entrusted it with
the view to permitting its adoption. It is true that the parents'
decision to recover their child probably was motivated by family
indignation over their action, but the writer must agree with
Justice Ponder's dissent that this is insufficient reason under
the law to deny them that custody.
Other decisions on the subject of custody were of more
34
routine character.

PROPERTY
Joseph Dainow*
SERVITUDES

In the combined cases of Fontenot v. Magnolia Petroleum Co.
and Young v. Magnolia Petroleum Co.,' the court achieved a result which might well seem to be the right and equitable one in
the administration of justice, but an analysis of its opinion leaves
one in unavoidable confusion. The two plaintiffs, Fontenot and
Young, owned adjacent properties; the defendants were petroleum and engineering companies prospecting for oil. The plaintiff Young gave oral permission to the defendants to enter upon
his land and there conduct geophysical operations; the plaintiff
Fontenot had refused entry on his property. As a result of defendants' sub-surface blasting explosions, certain damages were
caused in the homes of the two plaintiffs. The court rendered
judgment in favor of both plaintiffs covering actual damage in32. LA. R.S. 9:401 et seq. 9:551 (1950).
33. 227 La. 957, 81 So.2d 8 (1955).
34. Wyatt v. Wyatt, 228 La. 77, 81 So.2d 775 (1955), denying the availability
of a suspensive appeal in custody cases; and Decker v. Landry, 227 La. 603, 80
So.2d 91 (1955)

and Sharp v. Sharp, 228 La. 126, 81 So.2d 833 (1955), dealing

with issues of fact rather than law in the award of custody after separation and
divorce.
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 227 La. 866, 80 So.2d 845 (1955).

